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A B S T R A C T
We tested the effects of prepopulated returns and accuracy confirmation on compliance. Participants were asked
to report correct liabilities for different types of returns, whereby some had to confirm the accuracy of each
reported liability and others not. Results showed that correctly prefilled returns yielded the highest rate of
compliance, followed by returns that were not prefilled, followed by returns that overestimated liabilities, and
with returns that underestimated liabilities displaying the lowest compliance. Moreover, accuracy confirmation
increased compliance only for returns that overestimated liabilities. The present study indicates that both
morality and defaults play a pivotal role in shaping the effects of prepopulated returns on compliance. Our
findings imply that prepopulating tax returns should be done with care, because it can increase tax compliance
when done correctly, but undermine it when done incorrectly.
One of the most significant innovations over the last twenty years in
personal income tax systems, has been the development of pre-
populated tax returns. Tax administrations use data from their own
records and information that has been collected from third parties to
prepare these returns. To establish accurate tax liabilities, taxpayers are
usually required to check that prefilled information is complete and
correct, and if this is not the case to self-report the correct and relevant
information. Prepopulated returns increase administrative efficiency
and make compliance with tax laws easier. Not surprisingly, these re-
turns are becoming the norm—a notion corroborated by a recent survey
showing that in 40 of the 58 surveyed advanced and emerging econo-
mies, personal income tax returns are (at least in part) prepopulated by
tax administrations (OECD, 2019).
Prepopulated returns, however, may have a downside, as prefilling
returns constitutes a change in choice architecture that may influence
the perceived unethicality of tax evasion. In traditional returns, tax-
payers need to self-report all relevant information—which can be done
correctly or incorrectly. The choice architecture of prepopulated re-
turns, however, requires taxpayers to review the accuracy of prefilled
information—whereby they should retain accurate information, add
missing information, and correct inaccurate information. We posit that
especially this last requirement may impact how unethical taxpayers
consider underreporting.
Traditional economic models explain dishonesty as an economic
trade-off between the expected benefits of cheating and its perceived
costs. According to this view, tax evasion would be a function of the
expected financial gain of underreporting, the chances of being caught,
and the imposed fines when being caught (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972;
Becker, 1968). Modern perspectives on decisions in the moral domain
have criticized the economic cost-benefit view as being too narrow. In
particular, perspectives that consider morality as an underlying driver
of decisions assume that people (also) derive utility from an internal
standard of being able to see themselves as a moral person
(Jacobsen, Fosgaard, & Pascual-Ezama, 2018; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely,
2008). According to these views, people are only prepared to cheat if
they can maintain a self-concept of being honest; self-serving dis-
honesty would then be restrained by a concern to perceive oneself as
moral. Any aspect that allows people to reduce ethical dissonance—the
internal conflict between the temptation to profit from unethical be-
haviour and the desire to maintain a positive image of oneself—then
constitutes a potential risk factor for cheating (Ayal, Gino, Barkan, &
Ariely, 2015). We contend that prepopulated tax returns constitute such
an aspect; a reasoning that fits with Jacobsen et al. (2018), who iden-
tified choice architecture as a potential situational risk factor for
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unethical behaviour.
An example of how choice architecture may induce dishonesty was
provided by Mazar & Hawkins (2015), who showed that cheating was
more likely when it involved passively accepting an incorrect (ad-
vantageous) default than when it meant actively overwriting a correct
default. The underlying notion that maintaining a positive self-concept
is less difficult for passive than for active acts of dishonesty aligns with
the broader literature on omission bias showing that immoral acts of
omission are judged as less maliciously motivated and less morally re-
prehensible than immoral acts of commission (Spranca, Minsk, & Baron,
1991). While these studies did not explicitly address tax returns, the
relevance seems clear: Whereas correctly prepopulated returns can
promote compliance, incorrectly prepopulated returns can undermine
it.
Prefilling tax returns with accurate information will likely lead to
more compliance. In prepopulated returns, changing correct entries
into incorrect ones requires more (immoral) action than ‘just’ filling out
incorrect information in non-prepopulated returns. Both compliance
decisions require filling out incorrect information, but the former also
requires overwriting correctly prefilled information and thus is a more
active—and hence more immoral—form of non-compliance. In con-
trast, incorrectly prepopulated returns may lead to more under-
reporting. Taxpayers may be especially tempted to be non-compliant if
prepopulated returns contain inaccuracies that are advantageous, when
left uncorrected—thereby providing financial benefits at little moral
costs.
Inactions leading to non-compliance do not necessarily imply a self-
serving motive. Prefilled information can serve as default option-
s—certain courses of action that take effect if nothing is specified by the
decision-maker (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008)—that nudge taxpayers to-
ward accepting preset liabilities (status-quo bias).1 Doing so would
positively affect compliance when liabilities are preset correctly, but
negatively when they are preset incorrectly. Default effects should
equally affect compliance in prepopulated returns that overestimate
liabilities and in those that underestimate liabilities. A morality per-
spective on compliance, however, predicts that compliance will be
more prevalent in latter returns—those that yield financial benefits
when left unchanged.
Arguing from a morality perspective, the above can be summarized
in the overarching hypothesis that correctly prefilled returns (correct
returns) yield more compliance than returns that are not prefilled (blank
returns), incorrectly prefilled returns that overestimate liabilities (higher
returns), and incorrectly prefilled returns that underestimate liabilities
(lower returns), respectively. We tested this hypothesis in a study that
resembled a tax setting, and in which relevant data fields were some-
times left blank, sometimes correctly prefilled, sometimes prefilled with
too high liabilities, and sometimes prefilled with too low liabilities.
Compliance was measured as the percentage of liabilities that were
correctly reported.
Experimental research on the impact of prepopulated tax returns on
compliance has been sparse and the results far from conclusive, some-
times even conflicting. To illustrate, Fonseca and Grimshaw (2017)
found that compliance was the same in correct returns as in blank re-
turns, and observed more compliance in those returns than in higher or
lower returns—whereby the latter two did not differ in compliance. In
contrast, both Doxey, Lawson, & Stinson (2019) and Fochmann, Müller,
& Overesch (2018) found that compliance in correct returns was the
same as in higher returns and also found more compliance in those re-
turns than in blank and lower returns. Moreover, Doxey et al. found more
compliance in blank returns than in lower returns, whereas in Fochman
et al.’s study no difference in compliance was found between these types
of returns. Thus, the only consistent finding in these studies was that
correct returns yielded more compliance than lower returns; none of
these studies supported a morality interpretation of compliance.2
Research on dishonesty indicates that most people, rather than
cheating all the time, occasionally act dishonestly while being honest on
other occasions. This combination helps them to maintain a self-concept
of being a moral person (Ayal et al., 2015; Jacobsen et al., 2018;
Mazar et al., 2008). The inconclusive findings of aforementioned studies
might have been due to insufficient leeway given to participants to cheat
in a self-perceived acceptable way. In these earlier studies, participants
made only a few compliance decisions (four or six), which restricted their
opportunities to cheat on some and be honest on other occasions.
In the present study, we aimed at getting a more conclusive answer
to the question how prepopulated returns impact compliance. We
conducted a high-powered, controlled experiment in which participants
had to make 100 compliance decisions. This provided participants with
ample opportunity to combine honest and dishonest decisions in a way
that enabled them to cheat without necessarily seeing themselves as an
immoral person. Additionally, we tested another form of choice archi-
tecture that could possibly affect tax compliance: As a between-parti-
cipants manipulation, half of the participants were presented with tick
boxes that required them to confirm the accuracy of each liability they
reported. We introduced this intervention, because we expected that it
would improve compliance—a hypothesis based on several arguments.
First, theorizing suggests that subtle measures to heighten self-en-
gagement may increase honesty (Ayal et al., 2015). Confirming the
accuracy of liabilities may constitute such a measure and yield a similar
effect on in reviewing and filing tax returns. In addition, for each type
of return, accuracy confirmation makes non-compliance a more active,
hence more immoral, decision that is taken less likely. Furthermore, the
required confirmation increases attention to the prefilled information,
which should heighten alertness for inaccuracies, making corrections
more likely. To our knowledge, we are the first to test this intervention
in a tax setting.
1. Method
1.1. Design and participants
One hundred and two students from Leiden University were ran-
domly assigned to one of the two conditions of a mixed design with
Returns (correct, blank, lower, higher) as within-participants factor and
Confirmation (non-confirmation, confirmation) as between-participants
factor.3
1 In the current study, we were not able to tease apart omission bias from
status-quo bias. In our paradigm, inaction always leads to reporting the pre-
filled liabilities, whereas to make changes to prefilled liabilities, action is al-
ways needed. This feature that by retaining the prefilled numbers one is both
inactive and retains the status quo is a correct description of how prefilled tax
forms work. From a research standpoint one could argue that one cannot dis-
entangle these effects in prefilled tax forms. This is not unique to tax studies but
in fact often observed in decision-making research. Ritov and Baron (1992) are
among the few who untangled these biases. In their decision-making research,
they used scenarios in which change occurred unless action was taken, and they
concluded that omission bias plays a major role in status-quo bias. In a tax
setting, however, implementing a change unless one takes action seems un-
realistic.
2 Other noteworthy research on prepopulated tax forms and compliance
concerns a study by Kotakorpi and Laamanen (2016). Using data from a Finnish
policy experiment, they found that receiving a (partially) prefilled income tax
return lead to a significant reduction in non-prefilled deductions and self-re-
ported income, and an increase in deductions that were prefilled in the new
system. Outside the tax context, Duncan and Li (2018) found in a context-free
experiment that prefilled values increased honest reporting, whereas Morrison
and Ruffle, (2020) in an insurance context found that prefilled values were only
limited in their ability to reduce dishonesty in claim reports.
3 We aimed to recruit 50 participants per between-participants condition,
consistent with previous recommendations (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn,
2013).
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1.2. Procedure, task, and experimental manipulations
Upon arrival, participants received an envelope containing a form
that listed the correct liabilities for the task (see below). Participants
were seated in separate cubicles, and received instructions and com-
pleted the task on a computer. The study was approved by the in-
stitutional ethics board and informed consent was obtained from all
participants. After completing the study, participants were fully de-
briefed, paid, and thanked.
The task consisted of reviewing and filing 100 (simplified) tax re-
turns. Participants were asked to report, for each return, the correct
liability that was listed on the earlier received form. There were 25
returns of each type of return and the presentation order for these 100
returns was randomized. During the task, four returns were presented
simultaneously below each other on a screen, and participants were
thus presented with 25 screens in total.4
All returns had an income field on the left and a liability field on the
right. Each of the 100 returns included a different income, which was a
random number between 90,000 and 110,000 points. The correct lia-
bility also differed for each of the 100 returns and was a random per-
centage between 48% and 52% of the shown income. Whereas the 100
income fields were always correctly prefilled, the 100 liability fields
were not—these fields were correctly prefilled (correct returns: 25x), not
prefilled (blank returns: 25x), incorrectly prefilled with liabilities that
were 10% too low (lower returns: 25x), or incorrectly prefilled with li-
abilities that were 10% too high (higher returns: 25x).
Although participants were asked to report the correct liabilities,
they could report any liability they wanted with the restriction that it
could not be lower than zero. Participants were also not allowed to
leave liability fields empty. After filing all four returns on a screen,
participants continued to the next screen with again four returns; this
continued until all 100 returns were presented and filed. The details of
the returns and the order in which they were presented were the same
for all participants.
Participants were informed that after filing all returns, reported li-
abilities would be subtracted from their total income, and remaining
points would be converted into money (€0.05 per 100,000 points),
rounded off to the nearest €0.10, and paid out. Instructions clarified
that payoffs could vary between €0 and €5, and included examples of
possible payoffs; these examples made apparent that lower (higher)
reported liabilities increased (decreased) payoffs.
Participants were also informed that there was a 5% chance that,
after they filed all their returns, these returns would be audited. After
participants had filed all 100 returns, their returns were independently
audited with a 5% probability. Payoffs were calculated as follows: (1)
when there was no audit, payoffs were calculated as described before;
(2) when there was an audit and participants’ total reported liabilities
were equal or higher than the correct total, payoffs were calculated as
described before; and (3) when there was an audit and participants’
total reported liabilities were lower than the correct total, the amount
of underreporting was subtracted twice from their total income. This
third calculation corresponds to a situation in which audited tax eva-
ders have to pay the liabilities they still owed, increased with a fine of
100% of the underreported liabilities. With this payoff structure, full
evasion (i.e., reporting a liability of 0 for all 100 returns) would yield
the highest payoff possible (€5) when there was no audit, but the lowest
(€0) when an audit did take place. Independent of whether there was an
audit, full compliance (i.e., reporting the correct liability for all 100
returns) would result in a payoff of approximately €2.50, whereas over-
reporting would results in a payoff between €0 and €2.50.
In the confirmation condition, participants needed to confirm the
accuracy of each reported liability separately by ticking a box, placed to
the right of each liability field and labelled ‘The liability that I report is
the correct liability’. Thus, in this condition, participants had to tick in
total 100 boxes, one for each liability they reported. Participants in the
non-confirmation condition were not presented with tick boxes and not
required to confirm the accuracy of the liabilities they reported.
2. Results and discussion
Data from four outliers on age (> 7 SDs older) were excluded from
the analyses.5 During the task, 33 participants were mistakenly pre-
sented with an incorrect liability on their list for the fourth correct
return, and their responses for this return were coded as missing values.
Consequently, analyses were performed with data from 98 participants
(75 women, 23 men; Mage = 21.89 years, SD = 3.19) and included
9,767 observations (i.e., 100 compliance decisions of 65 participants
made and 99 compliance decisions of 33 participants). There were 51
participants in the non-confirmation condition and 47 in the con-
firmation condition.6 On average, participants needed 21 minutes to
complete the study. Returns of two participants were audited, and their
mean earnings were €2.35 (SD = €0.21).7 For the 96 participants
whose returns were not audited, mean earnings were €2.97
(SD = €0.79). Whereas 12 participants showed full compliance (i.e.,
reported the correct liability for all 100 returns), 13 choose full evasion
(i.e., reported a liability of 0 for all 100 returns).
2.1. Overview of the analyses
We first conducted an overall repeated-measures analysis of var-
iance (ANOVA). As previous research has shown that people are more
likely to cheat when they are tired or bored (see Jacobsen et al., 2018),
we included the position of the returns in the task as an additional
factor in the analysis. To assess this factor, termed Time, we divided the
100 returns into five blocks of 20 returns, whereby a block consisted of
five consecutive returns of each of type of return. That is, the first block
consisted of the first five correct returns, the first five blank returns, the
first five higher returns, and the first five lower returns. The second
block consisted of the next five consecutive correct, blank, higher, and
lower returns, etc. The overall analysis was thus performed with Re-
turns (correct, blank, higher, lower) and Time (block 1, block 2, block
3, block 4, block 5) as repeated measures, Confirmation (non-con-
firmation, confirmation) as between-participants factor, and com-
pliance as dependent variable.8 As robustness test, we reran the overall
analysis without data from participants who displayed either full
compliance or full evasion. Below, we first report the findings of the
overall analysis, and discuss the effect of Time on compliance. This is
followed by an evaluation of the first hypothesis, including both
planned and post-hoc comparisons. Next, we evaluate the second hy-
pothesis, again with several follow-up analyses.
4 In the current study, randomisation resulted in a maximum of three returns
of the same type on one screen.
5 Three outliers had been assigned to the confirmation condition and one to
the non-confirmation condition (they were 46, 53, 59, and 61 years old, re-
spectively).
6 For the reported analyses, the confirmation (12 men and 35 women) and the
non-confirmation condition (11 men and 40 women) did not differ in gender
composition (χ2[1] = 0.21, p = .81), nor did participants in the confirmation
condition (Mage= 21.89 years, SD = 2.94) differ in age from those in non-
confirmation condition (Mage= 21.88 years, SD= 3.43), t(98) = 0.17, p= .65.
7 A show-up fee of €1 is not included in the reported payments.
8 An analysis with gender as an additional factor in the design showed the
same pattern of results. No interactions with gender were found, and therefore
data were collapsed across gender for the reported analyses. Results did show a
main effect of gender, which indicated that female participants were more
compliant (M = 67.2%, SD= 37.4) than male participants (M= 38.7%, SD=
39.1), F(1, 94) = 10.66, p = .002. This finding is consistent with previous
research suggesting that, generally, males cheat more than females
(Duncan and Li 2018; Jacobsen et al., 2018).
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2.2. Overall analysis
Results of the overall analysis showed a main effect of Returns, a
main effect of Time, but no main effect of Confirmation (the robustness
test, however, did yield this main effect). We also found an interaction
between Returns and Time and a (marginally significant) interaction
between Returns and Confirmation, but neither an interaction between
Time and Confirmation nor a three-way interaction between Returns,
Time, and Confirmation (see Table 1, for test statistics).
2.3. The effect of time on compliance
The effect of Time indicated that, overall, participants became less
compliant over time (62.5%, 61.8%, 59.9%, 59.8%, and 58.5%, for the
five consecutive blocks). Moreover, post-hoc comparisons to interpret
the Returns × Time interaction showed that compliance decreased over
time in blank returns (F[4, 267.79] = 4.48, p= .005), higher returns (F
[4, 277.84] = 4.20, p= .007), and lower returns (F[4, 276.97] = 2.25,
p = .059), but not in correct returns (F[4, 247.10] = 0.51, p = .64)
(see Fig. 1).9 The decrease in compliance over time is consistent with
aforementioned research (see Jacobsen et al., 2018). A compelling
reason for the constantly high prevalence of compliance in correct re-
turns is that in these returns inaction (e.g., due to tiredness or boredom)
automatically results in compliance.
2.4. The effect of type of return on compliance
To test the first hypothesis, we examined the effect of Returns on
compliance in the non-confirmation condition only. Results supported
the hypothesis and showed more compliance in correct returns (69.9%)
than in blank returns (56.2%), higher returns (50.2%), and lower re-
turns (41.3%), respectively (see Table 2, upper row).10,11 The result
that compliance was more prevalent in accurately prefilled returns than
in returns that were either incorrectly prefilled or not prefilled is con-
sistent with both a morality perspective on compliance and a default
effect. Our finding, however, that lower returns yielded less compliance
than higher returns aligns with an ethical dissonance argument, but not
with a default effect. With this observation we do not mean to imply
Table 1
Test statistics of main and interaction effects of the overall test including the total sample and the selected sample.
Test statistics
Total sample (n = 98) Selected sample (n = 73)
Returns (within-participants) F(2.23, 214.19) = 35.64 p < .001 F(2.38, 168.98) = 40.99 p < .001
Time (within-participants) F(2.12, 203.47) = 4.49 p = .011 F(2.14, 152.10) = 4.47 p = .011
Confirmation (between-participants) F(1, 96) = 2.55 p = .11 F(1, 71) = 5.13 p = .027
Returns × Time F(7.67, 736.51) = 2.20 p = .028 F(7.69, 545.80) = 2.22 p = .026
Returns × Confirmation F(2.23, 214.19) = 2.58 p = .072 F(2.38, 168.98) = 2.98 p = .045
Time × Confirmation F(2.12, 203.47) = 0.34 p = .85 F(2.14, 152.10) = 0.28 p = .77
Returns × Time × Confirmation F(7.67, 736.51) = 1.41 p = .19 F(7.69, 545.80) = 1.43 p = .18
Note. The selected sample did not include the data from participants who displayed either full compliance (i.e., reported the correct liability for all 100 returns;













Correct Blank Higher Lower
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5
Fig. 1. Compliance per type of return for five consecutive blocks of 20 returns.
9 Robustness tests, in which we reran the analyses without data from parti-
cipants who displayed either full compliance or full evasion, yielded the same
pattern of results.
10 In the current research, the magnitude of the inaccuracy in lower and
higher returns was set at 10%. From a morality perspective, not adjusting ad-
vantageous inaccuracies should yield higher moral costs, the larger the in-
accuracies. Whereas the moral costs of non-adjustments of disadvantageous
inaccuracies would not be affected by the size of the inaccuracies. This would
imply that for lower returns, but not for higher returns, non-compliance de-
creases with increasing size of the inaccuracies. Future research could examine
this by varying the size of inaccuracies in incorrectly prefilled returns. For
example, by presenting participants with returns that are prefilled with li-
abilities that are 10% vs 50% vs 90% too low or too high.
11 Additionally, we conducted a one-sample t-test in which the mean of ad-
vantageous inaccuracies (i.e., too low reported liabilities) in blank returns was
tested against -10% (i.e., the percentage that was implemented in the in-
correctly prefilled returns). In this analysis, only participants from the non-
confirmation condition and who reported at least one incorrect liability were
included (n = 32). Results showed that the inaccuracy for blank returns was
greater (M = -26.2%, SD = 40.3%) than -10%, t(31) = 2.27, p = .03. A ro-
bustness test, in which the analysis was rerun excluding participants who dis-
played full evasion (n= 4), indicated that the mean inaccuracy in blank returns
was not different from -10%, t(27) = 0.97, p = .34. This finding indicated that
the difference in compliance between lower and blank returns was not due to a
difference between these returns in the size of inaccuracies. Only 9 participants
in the non-confirmation condition reported at least one disadvantageous lia-
bility (i.e., a too high reported liability) in the blank returns. Therefore, no
analysis was conducted for disadvantageous inaccuracies.
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that the default effect did not play any role in our study. After all, we
did observe that at least some participants retained incorrectly over-
estimated liabilities (in the case of higher returns), while it would have
been in their interest to correct these errors.
Results of a follow-up analysis also indicated that the reported li-
abilities are, at least in part, driven by a self-serving motive. According
to an ethical dissonance argument, incorrectly prefilled returns should
be less often adjusted if they contain liabilities that are too low—and
hence can provide financial benefits at little moral costs (i.e., by in-
action)—than if they are prefilled with liabilities that are too high.
Corroborating this notion, we found that lower returns were left un-
changed more often than higher returns (29.6% vs 15.6%; t
[50] = 3.67, p = .001; see Table 3). The finding that 15.6% of higher
returns—returns with disadvantageous inaccuracies—were not ad-
justed, however, indicates that compliance was also affected by defaults
settings.
Results of an additional follow-up analysis also indicated that that
compliance can be driven by both a self-serving motive and a pre-
ference for sticking to defaults. We found that of the 51 participants in
the non-confirmation condition, 24 left the same number of under-
estimated and overestimated liabilities unchanged. Whereas 21 parti-
cipants left underestimated liabilities more often unchanged than
overestimated liabilities, and only 6 participants left overestimated li-
abilities more often unchanged than underestimated liabilities. The
finding that nearly half of the participants did not differentiate between
advantageous and disadvantageous defaults fits with a preference to
retain the default. Whereas a morality perspective is supported by the
finding that there were statistically significant more participants who
reported advantageous defaults more often than disadvantageous de-
faults (n = 21), as compared to participants who reported dis-
advantageous defaults more often than advantageous defaults (n = 6),
χ(1) = 7.26, p = .01.
Thus, the evaluation of the first hypothesis and follow-up analyses
suggest that prepopulated returns are a potential risk for incorrect re-
porting. It does not necessarily imply a self-serving motive, however, as
prefilled liabilities also serve as default options that take effect when
insufficient attention is paid.
2.5. The effect of accuracy confirmation on compliance
To test the second hypothesis—accuracy confirmation increases
compliance—we examined the effect of Confirmation on compliance.
Results showed only the hypothesized main effect of Confirmation
when data of participants who showed full compliance or full evasion
were not included in the analysis (see Table 1). The Returns × Con-
firmation interaction, however, suggests that the effect of Confirmation
was moderated by type of return (see Table 1). To interpret this in-
teraction, we conducted post-hoc comparisons between both condi-
tions, separately for each type of return. Results yielded only a sig-
nificant difference for higher returns: more compliance was found in
the confirmation condition than in the non-confirmation condition
(71.5% vs 50.2%; t[95.85] = 2.44, p = .017; see Table 2).12
In the introduction, we argued that accuracy confirmation can in-
crease compliance for different reasons. First, confirming the accuracy
of reported liabilities makes non-compliance a more active, hence more
immoral, decision that is taken less likely. Consistent with the principle
of self-engagement (Ayal et al., 2015), we hypothesized that needing to
confirm the accuracy of each reported liability by ticking a box labelled
‘The liability that I report is the correct liability’ would increase com-
pliance. The absence of a reliable overall effect of accuracy confirma-
tion, however, did not fully support the hypothesis. It could be that our
intervention did not establish a strong enough relationship between
ticking an ‘honesty’ box and a more general perception of morality. In
other words, our intervention might not have been enough morally self-
engaging to yield more honest reporting.
Second, we argued that accuracy confirmation increases attention to
prefilled liabilities and thereby heightens alertness for inaccuracies,
Table 2
Mean percentages of compliance, under-compliance, and over-compliance per
type of return and confirmation condition (standard deviations between par-
entheses).
Returns
Correct Blank Higher Lower
Condition
Non-confirmation
Compliance 69.9a 56.2b 50.2c 41.3d
(39.8) (44.4) (45.9) (45.8)
Under-compliance 25.9a 34.6b 27.1a 53.0c
(36.8) (40.0) (35.7) (44.5)
Over-compliance 4.2a 9.2b 22.7c 5.6a,b
(16.1) (20.1) (32.3) (16.9)
Confirmation
Compliance 77.8a 69.6b 71.5b 49.5c
(37.8) (41.4) (40.6) (44.3)
Under-compliance 22.0a 28.9a 22.6a 49.5b
(37.7) (40.0) (35.7) (44.5)
Over-compliance 0.3a 1.4a 6.0a 0.9a
(1.0) (20.1) (32.3) (16.9)
Note. Compliance refers to correctly reported liabilities, under-compliance re-
fers to liabilities that are incorrectly reported and lower than correct liabilities,
and over-compliance refers to liabilities that are incorrectly reported and higher
than correct liabilities. Means per row with different superscripts differed sig-
nificantly (p < .05, with Holm-Bonferroni correction).
Table 3
Percentages of different types of adjustments made in higher and lower returns
per condition (standard deviations between parentheses).
Condition Non-confirmation Confirmation
Returns Higher Lower Higher Lower
No adjustments 15.6a, x 29.6a, y 4.8b, x 28.9a, y
(27.9) (35.8) (13.8) (38.2)
Adjustments: Correct 50.2a, x 41.3a, y 71.5b, x 49.5a, y
(27.9) (35.8) (13.8) (38.2
Adjustments: Too little downward 5.8a — 0.8b —
(13.2) (3.2)
Adjustments: Too much downward 27.1a, x 19.9a, y 22.6a, x 19.3a, x
(35.7) (32.7) (38.6) (36.2)
Adjustments: Too little upward — 3.4a — 1.3a
(7.1) (4.6)
Adjustments: Too much upward 1.2a, x 5.6a, y 0.3a, x 0.9a, y
(3.8) (16.9) (0.1) (1.2)
Adjustments: Total 84.4a, x 70.4a, y 95.2b, x 71.1a, y
(27.9) (35.8) (13.8) (38.2)
Note. Correct adjustments refer to changes made in either higher or lower re-
turns that resulted in the report of a correct liability. Too little downward ad-
justments refer to reported liabilities in higher returns that were lower than the
prefilled liabilities, but still higher than the correct liabilities. Too much
downward adjustments refer to reported liabilities in higher returns that were
lower than the correct liabilities, whereas they refer to reported liabilities in
lower returns that were lower than the incorrectly prefilled liabilities. Too little
upward adjustments refer to reported liabilities in lower returns that were
higher than the incorrectly prefilled liabilities, but still lower than the correct
liabilities. Too much upward adjustments refer to reported liabilities in either
higher or lower returns that were higher than the correct liabilities. Means per
row with different first superscript (a or b) differed significantly between
conditions, means per row with different second superscript (x or y) differed
significantly within condition (p < .05).
12 The robustness test showed, in addition to a significant difference for
higher returns (79.4% vs 50.3%; t[66.88] = 3.19, p = .002), also a significant
difference for blank returns (77.0% vs 58.6%; t[69.57] = 2.04, p = .045).
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which, in turn, makes corrections of inaccurate prepopulated returns
more likely, and hence increases compliance. This argument was sup-
ported by the obtained effect of accuracy confirmation for higher re-
turns. A finding, however, that also indicated that the intervention only
resulted in more adjustments to prepopulated returns if not changing
the prefilled liabilities would be financially costly. Results of several
post-hoc comparisons collaborated this notion. First, we found that,
overall, over-compliance was less prevalent in the confirmation con-
dition than in the non-confirmation condition (10.4% vs 2.1%; t
[57.26] = 3.15, p = .003), whereas this was not the case for under-
compliance (30.7% vs 35.2%; t[96] = 0.60, p = .55).13 Moreover, the
difference between conditions in over-compliance was larger for higher
returns (22.7% vs 6.0%; t[71.52] = 3.33, p = .001) than for correct
returns (4.2% vs 0.3%, t[50.44] = 1.72, p = .09), blank returns (9.2%
vs 1.4%, t[58.39] = 2.64, p= .011), and lower returns (5.6% vs 0.9%, t
[51.91] = 1.97, p = .054; see Table 2).14 For none of the types of
return, under-compliance differed between conditions (ts < 1, ps >
.53).15 Together, results of these follow-up analyses comparisons pro-
vide further support for the notion that our intervention increased
compliance mainly through decreasing over-compliance in higher re-
turns—that is, in incorrectly prefilled returns that would yield financial
costs if not adjusted (see Table 2).
The notion that our intervention seems more effective in heigh-
tening alertness to inaccuracies than in increasing honest reporting was
also corroborated by results of several post-hoc comparisons of (non-)
adjustments in higher and lower returns, specifically. First, we found
that for higher returns, the prevalence of making no adjustments was
lower in the confirmation condition than in the non-confirmation
condition (4.8% vs 15.6%; t[74.25] = 2.44, p < .001). Whereas for
lower returns, the percentage of no adjustments was the same in both
conditions (28.9% vs 29.6%; t[96] = 0.10, p= .92; see Table 3).16 This
indicates that our intervention reduced default effects for returns that
overestimated liabilities, but not for returns that underestimated li-
abilities. This notion was supported by our finding that higher returns
were more often correctly adjusted in the confirmation condition than
in the non-confirmation condition (71.5% vs 50.2%, t[95.85] = 2.44,
p = .017), whereas for lower returns no such difference was found
(49.5% vs 41.3%, t[96] = 0.90, p = .37).17 Thus, the evaluation of the
second hypothesis and follow-up analyses suggest that our intervention
did not reduce self-serving dishonest reporting, but it did increase
compliance through counteracting defaults effects in incorrectly pre-
filled returns that overestimated liabilities.
3. Conclusions
Our study showed that choice architecture in tax returns can induce
both correct and incorrect reporting: Whereas correctly prepopulated
returns promoted compliance, incorrectly prepopulated returns under-
mined it. Moreover, both moral costs and default effects played a pi-
votal role in shaping the effects of prepopulated tax returns on com-
pliance. Our finding that underreporting was more likely when it
needed less effort, supports a morality interpretation of compliance.
Whereas the observation that incorrectly prepopulated returns were
often left unchanged—even if this had negative financial con-
sequences—indicates that default effects also impact compliance be-
haviour. Results further suggest that needing to confirm the accuracy of
reported liabilities can make taxpayers more attentive to inaccuracies
in prepopulated returns, but also that it only nudges them into action
when correcting inaccuracies yields financial benefits. Such an inter-
vention may thus be more effective in reducing mindless overpayment
of taxes than (more) mindful tax evasion. As the present study indicates
that the effects of prepopulated tax returns on compliance are con-
tingent upon the accuracy of prefilling information, it implies that to
reap the intended positive effects of this form of choice architecture, tax
administrations should handle prefilling in tax returns with great care.
Supplementary materials
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.socec.2020.101574.
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